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Abstract
This paper provides evidence about the nominal wage determinants
in Spain during the period 1980-2000. We estimate a wage equation, us-
ing time series analysis applying an error correction mechanism. Our aim
is to analyse the extent to which the evolution of wages is influenced by
the unemployment, prices and productivity.
The results reveal that the unemployment rate has no effect on the
evolution of nominal wages. The variable that explains the evolution of
nominal wages in the long term is prices, showing slightly inflationary
behaviour. In the short term, wages are explained by their past values,
reflecting a nominal inertia.
Keywords: Wages; Unemployment; Productivity; Time series; Institu-
tional framework
JEL classification: J31, J59, J69
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is the analysis, by means of the time series tech-
nique, of the wage determinants in the Spanish economy during the period
1980-2000. We have chosen this period because it starts with the approval
of the “Estatuto de los Trabajadores” – a fundamental norm that regulates the
frame of the labour relations in Spain–, and it ends after the introduction
of the Euro –the moment in which Spain loses the monetary and exchange
rate policies as instruments of adjustment. Thus, main labour reforms took
place throughout this period in order to provide sufficient flexibility in the
labour market, and the current system of collective bargaining has been de-
veloped. The first contribution of this paper is to analyse these determinants
for a period that has not been tested yet in spite of its importance. It is a
very extensive period and takes in several economic cycles as well as impor-
tant changes in the institutional framework of the labour market which have
decisively influenced wage formation.
The cyclical changes in the Spanish economy during this period are re-
flected in the behaviour of variables such as inflation, unemployment and
productivity, all of which are related by the literature with the evolution of
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wages. Both in times of crisis and in growth, the setting of an adequate wage
level has been one of the principal concerns of economic policy.
The institutional changes mentioned above have also influenced wage evo-
lution because during this period the current system of collective bargaining
and the wage agreement policy were developed and several labour reforms
have been carried out. The influence of these institutional factors has modi-
fied the relationship shown by the original Phillips curve, as has been empiri-
cally observed in many countries over the last few decades, with simultaneous
increases of wages and of unemployment.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper has a twofold direction. Firstly,
we contrast whether there has existed a price-wage spiral due to the interme-
diate level of centralisation in the collective bargaining existing in Spain. This
hypothesis is based upon Bruno & Sachs (1985) and Calmfors & Driffill (1988,
2002) models, which analyse how the level of centralisation in the collective
bargaining influences wage evolution.
Secondly, we contrast if unemployment has influenced wage moderation.
The existence of important institutional rigidities in the Spanish labour mar-
ket, which explain the high structural unemployment level (NAIRU), would
lead to the lack of relationship between unemployment level and wage mod-
eration. This hypothesis is based upon Layard & Nickell (1985) and Layard
et al. (1991), who point out that wages depend on the unemployment rate and
the deviations of such rate from the NAIRU.
Within this context of reference, we test for a cointegration relationship
between nominal wages and their determinants in Spain, as well as the short-
term relationship between them and the adjustment to long-term equilib-
rium, by estimating an error correction mechanism. This is an additional
contribution of the paper as this technique has not been used in papers deal-
ing with the Spanish labour market. We have chosen to specify an equation
where the dependent variable is nominal wages because this allows us, as well
as to test the flexibility of wages with respect to unemployment and produc-
tivity, to analyse whether there is a prices- wages spiral in the long term and
nominal wage inertia in the short term.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the the-
oretical framework that analyses wage determinants from a macroeconomic
perspective. Section 3 presents the model and the methodology used. Section
4 gives the main results of the tests, while Section 5 contains the most relevant
conclusions. The bibliographical references close the paper.
2 Review of the literature
The theoretical framework related to wage determination based on the rela-
tionship established by the Phillips curve, has evolved from linking the evo-
lution of wage increases negatively with unemployment rates and their varia-
tions to establishing a relationship between the setting of wages and prices in
a framework of negotiation, with an unemployment rate that, in equilibrium,
coincides with the structural unemployment rate or NAIRU.
Thus, the approach initially adopted by Phillips (1958) has undergone
successive improvement with the contributions of Phelps (1967) and Fried-
man (1968) about the natural unemployment rate. Following this theoretical
proposal, Lipsey & Parkin (1970) point out that the flexibility of wages with
Wage Determinants 201
respect to the unemployment rate is reduced when social agreements are ap-
plied, which shows the existence of rigidities in the institutional framework
of the labour market. This weak explanatory power of the unemployment rate
with respect to wages is also reflected in Parkin et al. (1976) and in Brandsma
& VanderWindt (1983), the first paper finding a strong influence of prices on
the determination of nominal wages.
Layard & Nickell (1985) and Layard et al. (1991) explain wage determi-
nation through the policy of price setting by the firms and the negotiation
process. In this context, if there is no compatibility in the setting of prices
and wages, an inflationary spiral will appear which will depend on the rela-
tion between the NAIRU and the effective unemployment rate. The authors
cited above define a dynamic wage equation where unemployment, prices,
productivity and institutional factors play an important role. In this theoret-
ical framework, Nymoen (1989) finds a significant effect of consumer prices
on wages in the short term, while productivity emerges as significant in the
long run.
More recently, Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) propose a model in which the
downward nominal wage rigidity is contemplated, as well as the role of the
expectations in the wage bargaining. A model with similar characteristics has
been tested by Napolitano (2000), and shows the existence of an inflationary
spiral and a trend of wage growth over time. Broersma & denButter (2002)
also find that wages depend on their past values and on the variation of past
prices. For Ascari (2003), the lack of mobility of the labour factor plays a key
role in explaining the nominal rigidity in models of wage setting. Nymoen &
Rodseth (2003) also find a low flexibility and that income policies only have
visible effects on wages when they are implemented with strong legal mea-
sures. Karanassou et al. (2005, 2008a) analyse the persistence of prices and
wages observed in most countries in recent years, showing that wages adjust
faster than prices, that the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to produc-
tivity indicates that about two thirds of productivity gains are translated into
wage increases. Finally, unemployment puts downward pressure on wages.
With respect to the Spanish economy, the existing papers show, in gen-
eral, a significant influence of the unemployment rate on wages for different
periods. Among them, we can cite Dolado et al. (1986) who also find a sig-
nificant effect of the bargaining variables. Coe (1988), however, finds that the
unemployment rate and inflation have no significant influence on changes of
wages. Andrés & García (1990) highlight, along with the significance of un-
employment already mentioned, the lack of inertia in wage growth as well as
its rapid response to changes in prices. López (1991) points out that the esti-
mated value of the elasticity of real wages with respect to the unemployment
rate is negative and slightly above unity. For Anderton (1993, 1998), wages
are negatively related to unemployment, a structural break appearing after
the 1984 reform, which introduced greater flexibility into the hiring system.
Karanassou et al. (2008b) observe that in Spain wages are inversely related to
the unemployment rate and positively related to productivity, and there is a
substantial effect of prices on wages.
The aforementioned papers test a wage equation with different explana-
tory variables. However, they do not incorporate any hypotheses which relate
the institutional framework of the labour market with the influence of such
variables upon wage evolution. This relationship, which we consider of great
importance, is studied in this paper from two institutional perspectives: the
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collective bargaining system and the labour reforms. Both perspectives have
been the object of priority attention by the economic authorities and the Span-
ish social agents throughout the period under study.
With respect to the bargaining system, Bruno & Sachs (1985) model anal-
yses its importance upon wage determination, depending on the level of cen-
tralisation in such bargaining. According to this model, in countries with a
centralised system, trade unions bear in mind the inflationary effects of wage
increase. This will lead them tomoderate their demands. Conversely, in coun-
tries with a less centralised system, an individual trade union considers that
the effect of its demands on the general price level is low. Thus, we are in the
presence of a non-cooperative game which will lead to a superior wage level.
Calmfors & Driffill (1988) introduce in their model the effect of a highly
decentralised system on wages, showing that the relationship between the
level of centralisation in the bargaining process and the levels of wage in-
flation would be represented by means of an inverted U-shape curve. This
is so because, if there exists a highly decentralised bargaining system at the
firm level, wage demands will have a direct effect on its competitiveness. This
will lead to less employment so trade unions will moderate their demands.
Thus, countries with highly centralised or highly decentralised systems will
have higher wage moderation than countries with intermediate centralisation
levels. This thesis is again developed in Calmfors & Driffill (2002).
As regards labour reforms, these aim to achieve higher flexibility in the
labour market, thus allowing a closest relationship between unemployment
level and wage moderation, avoiding simultaneous wage and employment
increase. Layard et al. (1991) model claims that wages depend on the un-
employment rate and the deviations of such rate from the NAIRU. Only an
unemployment level higher than the NAIRU can have effects on wage moder-
ation and decrease trade union’s ability to put pressure. If structural unem-
ployment is high, wage moderation is low. Hence, NAIRU should be reduced
influencing upon the institutional factors that determine it, among which we
can highlight: labour force composition, geographical and functional mobil-
ity, generous unemployment benefits, workers’ willingness and capacity to
find a job and existence of training policies.
3 Empirical model and methodology
Following the theoretical framework developed in the previous section, that
reviewed the determination of wages, in this section we specify the following
equation to measure the effect on nominal wages of both the competitive com-
ponent, through the unemployment rate, and of the prices and productivity
variables that influence the negotiation process:
Wt = β0 + β1Ut + β2Pt + β3qt + t (1)
where Wt are the nominal wages measured by the total payments of all the
sectors of the economy; Pt is the average price level taken from the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), Ut is the aggregate unemployment rate and qt is the pro-
ductivity, measured with a proxy defined as the ratio between the GDP and
the level of employment.
The data are quarterly and the variables are expressed in logarithms. The
data come from the Synthesis of Economic Indicators series of the Ministry
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of Economy for wages, prices and productivity, and from the Spanish Labour
Force Survey of the National Institute of Statistics for unemployment.
As pointed out previously, the methodology used in this paper is based on
the analysis of time series with the error correctionmechanism. Sargan (1980)
was the pioneer in the use of this technique applied to the wages equation.
Later, Nymoen (1989), Dibooglu & Enders (2001), and Broersma & denButter
(2002) have used it in their work referring to other countries.
Most time series variables are better characterised as integrated processes
than under the hypothesis of stationarity. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse
the variables individually to determine their order of integration. To do so, we
have applied several unit root tests. We begin with the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF), applied to a model with a constant and a trend (except for
unemployment, which only presents a constant), for a maximum number of
lags of the differentiated variable lmax = 5, following the proposal of Ng &
Perron (1995), expressed as follows:
yt = µ+ βt + ρyt−1 +
l∑
i=1
φi∆yt−i + εt
Then we apply the GLS (DFGLS) Dickey-Fuller test proposed by Elliot
et al. (1996). Later we apply the Zt Phillips & Perron (1988) test, estimat-
ing the long term variance. To confirm the results obtained with these tests,
we use the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) test, where the null hypothesis is
that of stationarity1.
Having analysed the order of integration, if the series are I(1) and their
linear combination, when applying the cointegration vector, is stationary (the
residuals of the cointegration relation are I(0)), it means that there is a long-
term equilibrium relation between the variables of the model. This cointegra-
tion relation is analysed by applying the method of Engle & Granger (1987)
(E-G), estimating the cointegration vector by ordinary least squares (OLS) and
applying the ADF test to the residuals of the regression (1). In general, the
components of vector Xt are cointegrated of order d,b, with d ≥ b ≥ 0 ex-
pressed as Xt ∼ CI(d,b), if all the components of the vector are I(d) and there
is a cointegration vector α , 0 such that Zt = α′Xt ∼ I(d − b), with b > 0. We
propose to test the null hypothesis Zt ∼ I(1) against the alternative Zt ∼ I(0)
using, as we said, the ADF tests.
Furthermore, there is a close relation between cointegration and the error
correction models. The Granger Representation Theorem (Engle & Granger
1990) proves that the variables are cointegrated only if the relation between
them can be explained through an error correction model. The idea is that
part of the disequilibrium of a period is corrected in the following and, using
this method, the speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium can be mea-
sured, allowing a dynamic specification of the model in which the short- and
long-term relation between the variables is taken into account.
These models relate the change in the dependent variable with past equi-
librium errors, as well as with past changes in the explanatory variables.
1It should be pointed out that the autocorrelation functions in levels and first differences for
each variable do not allow us to discard the no-stationarity of the series. Nevertheless, they do
not show the presence of no-stationarity in the seasonal component and we decided not to carry
out seasonal unit root tests.
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Table 1: Unit root tests
ADF DFGLS Zt KPSS
Wt −0.18 −0.85 −1.71 3.22∗∗∗
Ut −2.03 −1.53 −2.22 3.04
∗∗∗
Pt −1.16 −1.68 −3.44 2.15∗∗∗
qt −0.75 −1.34 −3.29 0.20∗∗
Note: definition of the variables, the data
sources and the explanations of the unit root
tests are in Section 3
The critical values are tabulated in Maddala
and Kim (1999).
** signigicant at 5$
*** significant at 1%
In this way, for a vector time series Xt , the model can be represented as
A (B) (1−B)Xt = −γZt−1+ut , where ut is a stationary multivariate disturbance,
with A(0) = I , A(1) has all the elements finite, Zt = α′Xt , γ , 0, and B is the
backshift operator.
In this paper, we apply an error correction mechanism (ECM) using OLS
on the equation (1) in differences, where all the variables are stationary, taking
as the explanatory variable the lagged residuals of the long-term relation that
offer a link between the long- and the short-term relation of the variables of
the model.
4 Results of the estimation
The analysis of the order of integration, applying the tests referred to in the
previous section, allows us to conclude that, in no case, can the null hypoth-
esis of the existence of a unit root in the series be rejected. They all present a
stochastic trend in their data and, therefore, are integrated of order one (Table
1).
After analysing the order of integration, we tested for the existence of a
cointegration relation between the variables of the model. From the nominal
wage equation (1), we obtain the following results (Table 2)2: Estimation M1,
which includes only unemployment as the explanatory variable, shows a spu-
rious relation. Estimations M2 and M3 present a high R
2 and an absence of
correlation, as the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates. The ADF test applied
to the residuals of the regression allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. As for the value of the coefficients of the model, the variable
unemployment presents a low and positive value and, thus, does not have a
moderating effect on monetary wages3. On the other hand, the coefficient of
the prices variable is superior to one and highly significant. Therefore, the
2The seasonal dummy variables, Q1, Q2, Q3 , are included to correct for seasonability prob-
lems. Another variable, FU9400, which takes the values of unemployment during 1994-2000 and
zero in the other years, reflects the change of trend in the rate of unemployment during this pe-
riod. Furthermore, an institutional dummy variable, D8083, is introduced to measure the effect
of income policy during the period 1980-1983 and captures the structural break of the model
which is reflected by CUSUM S-Q test at 5% significance. The introduction of these dummies
greatly improves the specification, increasing the explanatory power of the model.
3This lack of significance of unemployment also appears in Coe (1988) and in Abraham et al.
(2000).
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Table 2: Estimation of nominal wages, 1980-
2000. E-G
Dependent variable: Wt
M1 M2 M3
Constant 12.71
(30.50)
6.53
(90.92)
5.57
(5.65)
Ut −0.27
(−1.95)
0.04
(2.85)
0.03
(2.40)
Pt 1.19
(99.62)
1.15
(23.49)
qt 0.16
(0.97)
D8083 −0.74
(−11.28)
0.07
(6.86)
0.07
(6.66)
FU9400 0.02
(9.81)
−5.6E − 04
(−1.85)
−7.6E − 04
(−2.08)
Q1 −0.07
(−3.39)
−0.14
(−27.14)
−0.14
(−27.10)
Q2 −0.16
(−2.82)
−0.13
(−24.96)
−0.13
(−24.93)
Q3 −0.07
(−1.22)
−0.05
(−10.18)
−0.05
(−9.92)
n 83 83
R2 0.83 0.99 0.99
R2 (adj.) 0.81 0.99 0.99
D-W 0.33 1.79 1.80
ADF-EG −2.89 −5.43∗∗ −5.37∗∗∗
Note: The data sources and the explanation of the
Engle and Granger (E-G) cointegration test are in
Section 3. The definition of the variables are in
Sections 3 and 4. In brackets, t-ratios to analyse
individual significance. The critical values are
tabulated in Engle and Yoo (1987)
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%
behaviour of nominal wages is explained by the evolution of prices, wages
being slightly inflationary4. Productivity shows a non-significant coefficient
while the dummy D8083 is significant, capturing the structural break that
represents a change in wage policy, based, after this period, on a social pacts
policy5.
Below, we carry out a short-term estimation of the model using OLS (Table
3), where the variables are defined in differences and the lagged residuals of
the long-term model previously analysed are also included. Furthermore, we
incorporate several lags of the dependent variable in differences and a lag of
the prices variable in differences as well as the dummy that measures the effect
of income policy in the period 1980-83 and the seasonal dummies mentioned
above. The results obtained are the following:
The two models estimated present good statistical properties, with an R2of
0.98 and a Durbin-Watson close to 2. The lagged residuals, in both cases, have
a negative and significant coefficient, reflecting the existence of a cointegra-
4Screpanti (2000) and Napolitano (2000) also find inflationary wage behaviour.
5Nymoen & Rodseth (2003) analyze, similarly, the effect of income policy on the wages in
different countries.
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Table 3: Short-term estimation of monetary wages ECM by
OLS
Dependent variable: dWt
1 2
Constant 0.02
(1.84)
0.02
(2.17)
dWt(−1) 0.18
(1.89)
0.18
(2.05)
dWt(−4) 0.47
(5.63)
0.48
(6.04)
dUt −0.02
(−0.27)
dPt 0.14
(0.57)
dPt(−1) 0.01
(0.02)
dqt −0.14
(−0.55)
Q1 −0.1
(−5.95)
−0.1
(−6.26)
Q2 0.01
(0.71)
0.01
(0.83)
Q3 0.02
(2.26)
0.02
(2.58)
D8083 0.01
(0.91)
0.01
(1.36)
Res(−1) −0.79
(−5.45)
−0.79
(−5.79)
n 78 78
R2 0.98 0.98
D-W 2.36 2.35
Note: The data sources and the explanation of the Error Correction
Mechanism (ECM) test are in Section 3. The definition of the variables
are in Sections 3 and 4. In brackets, t-ratios to analyse individual
significance
tion relation between the variables. This coefficient, with a value of around
–0.80, shows the speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium.
The analysis of the explanatory variables gives the following results. The
lags of the dependent variable present significant coefficients. Thus, the short-
term variation of wages is, to a great extent, explained by its lagged values,
showing the presence of nominal inertia. The variables unemployment, prices
and productivity present low and non-significant coefficients. The dummy
that measures the effect of income policy has a non-significant coefficient. In
consequence, only lagged wages determine the behaviour of monetary wages
in the short term.
To explain the results obtained, the dynamic of the increase of nominal
wages above the increase of prices found in the long-term relation, as well as
the existence of an important short-term nominal inertia, can be attributed
to the characteristics of the system of collective bargaining. The hypothesis
of Calmfors & Driffill (1988, 2002) proposes that the relation between the
degree of centralisation and the practice of wage moderation is not linear. In
intermediate bargaining, larger wage increases are normally agreed on than
in more decentralised bargaining, in which the situation and economic results
of each firm are taken into account, or at the more centralised national level,
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where more attention is paid to the possible negative effects of high wage
increases on inflation and the level of employment.
Following this hypothesis, we could ask ourselves how the Spanish model
of bargaining has evolved over recent years. The answer is that, although
the number of agreements signed with firms has increased, the percentage
of workers tied to the provincial and regional sector has continued to grow.
Consequently, intermediate bargaining predominates, giving rise to wage in-
creases that are parallel to or, sometimes, slightly higher than inflation6. The
wage agreement policy and the successive labour reforms in recent decades
have tried to modify this structure of collective bargaining, proposing greater
links between the different levels of bargaining and adapting to the particular
conditions of the firms.
Lastly, the lack of response of wages to unemployment is explained by
the rigidities of the institutional framework that come from the strong reg-
ulation of the labour market and have led to high levels of structural unem-
ployment (NAIRU)7. Only an unemployment level above the NAIRU will be
able to exert a significant influence on wages, managing to moderate their
growth. Among these institutional rigidities, we can highlight the generous
unemployment benefits, together with the absence of training policies; the
lack of labor mobility; non co-ordinated collective bargaining; a high income
tax level and the indexing of wages to inflation. Thus, the labour reforms of
the period were aimed at a greater flexibility of the institutional framework,
to permit a reduction of the NAIRU, a better adjustment between wage in-
creases and the growth of productivity, as well as a wage moderation in line
with macroeconomic objectives8.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented evidence about the variables that determine
the evolution of wages in Spain during the period 1980-2000. To do so, we
adopt a theoretical model of the augmented Phillips curve, that incorporates
the institutional framework into a context of bargaining, as a reference. The
estimation was carried out using the time series technique with an error cor-
rection mechanism, allowing us, as well as to test for the existence of a coin-
tegration relation, to analyse the short-term relation and the speed of adjust-
ment to long-term equilibrium.
The results obtained permit us to affirm that the evolution of nominal
wages in Spain during the period 1980-2000 is mainly explained by prices.
There is a long-term equilibrium relation between these two variables, with
a coefficient of prices that is significant, positive and higher than one, which
reflects that nominal wages were slightly inflationary. In the above cointegra-
tion relations, the unemployment rate is also included, with the result that
unemployment has not had a significant influence on nominal wages moder-
ation.
In the estimation of the error correction mechanism, it can be concluded,
first, that there is a cointegration relation between the variables of the model,
6Rodríguez (2004).
7Estrada et al. (2002) show a very high level of NAIRU for the Spanish economy during this
period, very close to the existing unemployment rate.
8See Segura (2004).
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correcting the short-term deviations, as the coefficient of the residuals of the
long-term relation shows. Second, nominal wages present, in the short term,
a strong nominal inertia, because their behaviour is mainly explained by past
values of wages. Lastly, the other variables are not significant in the evolution
of monetary wages in the short term.
When trying to explain these results, the structure of collective bargain-
ing, which has sometimes generated a prices-wages spiral and a nominal iner-
tia, should be borne in mind. Furthermore, the rigidities of the institutional
framework of the labour market have meant that nominal wages grew with-
out a connection to unemployment. The labour reforms carried out during
the period under study have tried to correct these problems. These reforms,
essentially, aim to modify the structure of the collective bargaining, the sys-
tems of hiring, the conditions of firing, the generosity of the unemployment
benefit, functional mobility and active labour market policies.
Nevertheless, the achievements of each of these objectives during the pe-
riod analysed were not totally satisfactory, leaving space for an agenda of fu-
ture reforms. Thus, the predominance of the intermediate level in the collec-
tive bargaining has made the practice of wage moderation difficult, in spite
of the attempts to foment the sector level of bargaining on a national scale
and the recent trend towards decentralisation with the increase of firm agree-
ments. As for the new systems of hiring that arose from the different reforms
with the aim of easing access to employment and, thus, reducing structural
unemployment, they have led to a high level of temporary employment and a
segmentation of the labour market that has impeded the flexibility of wages
with respect to unemployment. Finally, the measures taken to foment func-
tional and geographical mobility and active labour market policies, with the
aim of reducing the NAIRU, have been insufficient.
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